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Recent Decisions
INCOME TAXATION OF NET GIFTS -
HIRST v. COMMISSIONER
A net gift is a gratuitous transfer of property made "with a string
attached."' That is, the gift is made subject to an encumbrance or obligation
which either pre-exists, or arises at the time of the conveyance. 2 As is true of
all transfers of property for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, net gifts require the payment of federal gift taxes.
3
In a relatively recent line of cases, the Internal Revenue Service has
vigorously asserted that net gifts also have income tax ramifications to the
transferor. 4 This was the central issue in the recent case of Hirst v.
Commissioner.
5
In Hirst, the taxpayer was an eighty-one-year-old widow who owned
several parcels of greatly appreciated real estate6 that produced no income
and subjected Mrs. Hirst to heavy real estate tax liabilities. To relieve
herself of this drain on her few remaining liquid assets,7 Mrs. Hirst decided
to make a gift of the property to her son and his wife. However, because such
a gift required the payment of substantial gift taxes, she made it subject to
the condition that her son pay the attending gift taxes. The son agreed and
paid the gift taxes upon receipt of the property.8 The IRS attempted to tax as
1. See Note, Tax Consequences of Gifts Given with Strings Attached, 28 U. FLA.
L. REv. 682 (1976).
2. The reader should note that "the Internal Revenue Service might take
exception to the characterization of a gift of encumbered property as a 'net gift.' The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently no longer believes that there is such a thing
as a net gift .... ." Suwalsky, Net Gifts - A Critical Look at Johnson v.
Commissioner, 75-05 TAX MNGM'T MEM. (BNA) 2 (1975).
3. See I.R.C. §2501. For gift tax purposes, donative intent is normally
immaterial.
When the net gift involves a transfer to a donee who assumes the gift tax
obligation of the donor, the amount of the gift is reduced by the amount of the gift tax
that the donee must pay and the amount of the gift tax decreases as the amount of the
gift decreases. Thus, the net amount of the gift and the gift tax become mutually
dependent variables. To resolve the problems inherent in the computation of gift taxes
in this situation, formulae are provided in Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. 275.
4. See, e.g., Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 360 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969); Magnolia Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 934,
937-38 (1960).
There also may be estate tax implications concerning net gifts. For a
discussion of such implications, see Kopp, Gifts Subject to Donee Payment of Tax:
Timing, Risks and Computations, 27 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 375, 392-93 (1969).
5. 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
6. The donor's basis in the property was $8,377 and its fair market value was
$444,588.50. Id. at 435 (Thomsen, J., dissenting).
7. Mrs. Hirst's only cash was held in savings accounts totalling approximately
$25,000. Id. at 431 (Bryan, J., concurring).
8. His gift tax payments for the federal government and the State of Virginia
totalled $85,469.55. Id. at 436 (Thomsen, J., dissenting).
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income to Mrs. Hirst the amount by which the gift taxes paid by the son
exceeded Mrs. Hirst's basis in the property, approximately $77,000. 9 At trial,
the Tax Court held for the taxpayer,10 but this ruling was reversed by a
three-judge panel on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
After the opinion of the three-judge panel had been circulated, a majority of
the judges voted for a rehearing en banc and ultimately reversed the panel,
reinstating the Tax Court's decision.'
Before analyzing Hirst, it is useful to review the evolution of net gift
cases over the past twenty years. The earliest cases involving encumbered
gifts arose from rather blatant attempts by taxpayers to avoid IRS
treatment of their property transfers as taxable sales.12 Typically in these
cases, after finding a buyer for his property, the taxpayer encumbered the
property in an amount equal to the prearranged sales price, keeping the
amount of the loan. Then he made a "gift" of the property to the buyer (the
purported donee), who subsequently discharged the debt. The taxpayer would
assert that neither encumbering the property, nor making the gift
constituted taxable events. Although neither of these actions is normally
taxable, the situation in such cases was essentially equivalent to a sale of
the property to the recipient for an amount equal to the loan proceeds
retained by the donor. Thus, the Commissioner would assert that substance
should prevail over form and that there should be taxable income to the
donor on the transaction. Under the step transaction 3 and sham transfer
9. The Internal Revenue Service attempted to tax the transaction as part gift,
part sale. Id. at 429. The gift tax assumed by the donee was $85,469.55, and Mrs.
Hirst's basis in the property was $8,377. Id. at 436. Because the property was held for
longer than the six-month statutory holding period, only a long term capital gains tax
was assessed. See I.R.C. § 1202.
10. 63 T.C. 307 (1974).
11. 572 F.2d at 427.
12. See, e.g., Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1961); Magnolia Dev.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 934 (1960). It should be noted that there were
even earlier cases concerning what could be classified as net gifts, involving gifts
transferred to trusts. Under these cases the Commissioner asserted taxability by way
of I.R.C. § 677, which relates to the taxation of trust income to the settlor of the trust,
on the theory that all or a part of the trust income had been reserved for the settlor's
benefit. See, e.g., Estate of Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136
F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943) (trust instrument directed trustees
to pay settlor a sum of money which he used to pay gift taxes; Board of Tax Appeals
and Fifth Circuit both held that the income reserved by the donor was taxable to him
as ordinary income under § 677).
13. When a single transaction is broken up into several separate transactions in
an attempt to avoid taxes, the transactions are "stepped together" and viewed as a
single transaction. See, e.g., Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.
1937); Simon v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 935, 937 (1959), aff'd, 285 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.
1960) ("It is thus apparent ... that all the steps enumerated were part and parcel of
the same transaction . . . [and should be consolidated by this court].").
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doctrines, 4 courts had little trouble concluding that what had taken place
was in fact a disguised sale which should be taxed as such. 15
As the example illustrates, in the early cases the Commissioner used an
intent test to determine whether to tax the net gift transactions; if the
donor's intent was to avoid taxes rather than to make a gratuitous transfer,
the transaction was argued to be taxable. 16 While this test proved quite
useful for obvious sham transctions, it was doomed to failure in less con-
spicuous cases. For example, in Turner v. Commissioner 7 the donor made
gifts of highly appreciated securities to her children,' 8 who in turn promised
to pay the gift taxes associated with the transfer. Because gift taxes are
normally the liability of the donor,19 the donee's assumption of this liability
appeared to the Commissioner to be bargained-for consideration. Therefore,
he argued that the excess of the gift taxes over the donor's basis should be
taxed as income to her.2" The Tax Court rejected this contention, stating that
Turner's donative intent was clear and that an intent to make a sale rather
than a gift cannot be implied solely from the condition that the donee pay
14. A sham transaction is a false or counterfeit one. Williams v. Territory, 13
Ariz. 27, 29, 108 P. 243, 245 (1910). Under the sham transfer doctrine courts ignore the
form and look to the substance of the transaction. See, e.g., Magnolia Dev. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 934, 938 (1960).
15. One such case was Magnolia Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH)
934 (1960), in which a corporate taxpayer owned stock with a fair market value of
$42,500 and a basis of $10,444. After securing a purchaser, the taxpayer encumbered
the stock for $42,000 and conveyed it to a university. Immediately thereafter, the
university sold the stock to the waiting buyer, repaid the loan, and retained $500 for
its efforts. The Tax Court found the substance of the transactions to be "a sale of the
stock for a price $500 less than its fair market value of $42,500, thus making the
selling price $42,000, with a gift of the $500 balance .... " Id. at 937.
16. See id. at 938. ("In the instant case petitioner, in our opinion, was seeking to
avoid taxation by making the disposition of its stock . . . appear to be something
which in reality it was not. We must therefore ignore the form [of] the disposition...
and look only at the economic realities . ... ").
17. 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
18. Actually, the donor made nine separate gifts of low basis securities, three to
her children outright, and six to trusts for the benefit of her grandchildren. Id. at 358.
For purposes of comparison with Hirst, this Recent Decision will be concerned only
with the outright transfers by Mrs. Turner to her children.
19. I.R.C. § 2502(d) states without qualification that "[tihe tax imposed by section
2501 shall be paid by the donor."
20. In essence, the Commissioner considered the transfers to be in part a sale for
the amount of the gift tax paid and in part a gift of the net value of the property
received by the donees in excess of their gift tax payment obligations. 49 T.C. at 362.
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the gift tax.21 This position was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in a per
curiam opinion.22
Other courts subsequently followed the Turner court's rationale, 23
indicating that the Commissioner's position was not viable in cases like
Turner. The grantor's donative intent in such transactions is obvious and
the benefits received are not clearly tangible.24 Thus, the courts were
reluctant to treat the transactions as sales rather than as gifts.
Realizing that its intent approach was useless in all but the most
obvious net gift cases, the Service changed its attack by taking a broader
view of gross income. A gift is treated as a non-taxable disposition because
the donor does not realize any income when he makes a gift. Therefore, it
was asserted, the test should relate to whether the donor realized anything
from the transfer, rather than to his intent in making it. The Service pointed
to several United States Supreme Court decisions that stated that one
party's discharge of an obligation owed by another results in realized
income to the person whose obligation was paid.25 Thus, when property
subject to a pre-existing encumbrance was transferred to a party who
discharged the debt, the IRS claimed the transferor realized the amount of
the encumbrance as income.26 Similarly, when the donee agreed to pay the
donor's gift tax liability, the amount of the gift tax was said to be income to
the donor.27 The advantage of this approach from the government's point of
21. See id. at 363. The court also stated that under the Service's theory, the partial
step-up of a donee's basis (in an amount equal to the gift tax paid) would result in two
identical credits for the same payment, and concluded that
[the] strange result ... [of] allowing the transferees to twice receive credit for
the same amount of money, once as a payment and once as an adjustment for
gift tax paid, is a persuasive indication that the part sale, part gift
characterization is not appropriate to the facts of the instant case.
Id. at 363-64.
22. 410 F.2d at 753.
23. See, e.g., Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242, 1248 (1971); Estate of Davis v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363, 1368 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (5th
Cir. 1972).
24. Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts: The Advent of Crane,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 935, 944 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940). ("While ... economic
gain is not always taxable as income, .. . realization of gain need not be in cash
derived from the sale of an asset. Gain may occur as a result of ... payment of the
taxpayer's indebtedness, [or] relief from a liability .... "); Douglas v. Willicuts, 296
U.S. 1 (1935); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933), Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1081 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
27. A unique problem is presented when the potential donee of property assumes
liability for the gift tax incurred on the transfer. Upon making any gift the
donor is liable for the gift tax [I.R.C. § 2502(d)], but if it is not paid when due a
coextensive liability is settled on the donee [I.R.C. § 6324(b)]. The Code fails to
specify which of the two is then the primary debtor, and which is the surety
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view was that the donor's intent was entirely inconsequential; even the most
gratuitously motivated intrafamily net gifts could be taxed.
This new method of attack was first utilized successfully in Malone v.
United States.28 In Malone the taxpayer mortgaged his highly appreciated
farmland and then conveyed the property to an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of his children.2 9 The trustees assumed the debt shortly after
receiving the property. The government contended that the transaction
should be treated as a part sale in the amount of the encumbrance
discharged. In holding for the United States, the district court based its
decision on the theory that the debt discharged represented taxable income
to the donor regardless of his motive in making the transfer.30
Bolstered by the new theory's success in Malone, the Commissioner
utilized it in other net gift cases. In Johnson v. Commissioner3' the taxpayer
borrowed $200,000 from a bank, pledging stock with a basis of $10,000 and a
fair market value of $500,000 as collateral. 32 Two days later he transferred
the stock to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children. Shortly
thereafter, the trustees replaced Johnson's note with their own, relieving
him of all liability on the encumbrance. 33 As a result of this series of
transactions, the donor had $200,000 in cash and the trust owned stock
worth $500,000, encumbered by a $200,000 note. Later, Johnson paid
$150,000 in gift taxes on the transfer.
The taxpayer argued that his intent was wholly gratuitous and that
Turner required a conclusion that the transfer was nontaxable.34 The
.... [T]he Government, by arbitrarily choosing to collect from one party
rather than the other, appears to be able to affix the ultimate tax burden.
Note, Assumption of Indebtedness by a Donee - Income Tax Consequences, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 98, 104 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
If the donee becomes the principal debtor after the debt becomes due, does his
payment of the gift taxes, which relieves the donor of only a secondary liability for
the debt, still constitute income to the donor? Although no cases have been found
dealing with this question the answer appears to be that it does. The donor once had
primary liability for the debt and after the payment by the donee he has none. If the
gift by the donor is stepped together with the payment of gift taxes by the donee, see
generally note 13 supra, the entire transaction appears similar to a discharge of debt
case resulting in taxable income to the donor.
28. 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir.
1972). This argument was actually first utilized in the government's appellate brief in
Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972), but it was not even addressed by that court in its opinion.
Malone was the first case in which this theory was argued by the Commissioner from
the beginning of the case.
29. Part of the debt arose six months prior to the conveyance of the property to
the trust. The remainder of the debt arose several years before that conveyance. 326 F.
Supp. at 108.
30. Id. at 110.
31. 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040
(1974).
32. 495 F.2d at 1080.
33. Id.
34. Brief for Appellant at 1.
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Commissioner argued, as he had in Malone, that intent was immaterial and
that the debt assumed by the trustee should be taxed to the discharged
donor. 35 The Tax Court used an intent test but still found in favor of the
Commissioner. It distinguished the case from Turner on the ground that
Johnson's intent was to avoid a taxable sale rather than to make a
gratuitous transfer.36
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit expressly denied any reliance on an intent
test, conceding that if the donor's motivation were their guidepost the
taxpayer would win. 37 The court stated that the substance of the taxpayer's
various transactions was a transfer of stock worth $500,000 in exchange for
$200,000, $150,000 of which was to pay the donor's gift taxes.38 Basing its
views on the government's new theory, the court then proceeded to reject the
rationale of its earlier Turner decision:
[A taxpayer] defeat would be reached if we describe the $150,000 used to
pay the gift taxes ... as equivalent to what happened in Turner
(donees' assumption of donor's gift tax liability). If we view the $150,000
receipt as the payment of the donor's gift tax by the donee, then the
donor has nonetheless realized income. The gift tax liability is the
donor's legal obligation under section 2502(d) of the [Internal Revenue]
Code, and "[t]he discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is
equivalent to receipt by the person taxed." The payment of a donor's gift
tax liability by the donee constitutes income to the donor.39
Near the end of its opinion, the Johnson court once again emphasized
that Turner was no longer a viable decision:
Taxpayers cite Turner for the proposition that a donor realizes no
income when he makes a "net gift" . . . .The source of this asserted
principle lies in a maze of cases wherein the Commissioner tested out
§ 677(a) of the Code, which imposes a tax at ordinary income rates upon
amounts retained or received by a grantor upon transfer of property into
trusts. In none of these cases, however, did the Commissioner strongly
argue, nor did the courts carefully consider, what the Commissioner
argues here - that aside from section 677 certain amounts should be
35. Brief for Appellee at 3. More specifically, the Commissioner asserted that the
taxpayer had realized long term capital gain in the amount that the loan proceeds
exceeded his basis in the stock transferred ($200,000 minus $10,000). 495 F.2d at 1081.
36. 59 T.C. at 812-13.
37. The court said, "[w]ere we to view the Turner case in such broad terms ... it
would be difficult to distinguish this case from Turner." 495 F.2d at 1081.
38. Id. at 1082.
39. Id. at 1083 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). Proof was
submitted showing that the amount of the encumbrance was calculated to equal very
nearly the amount of Johnson's expected federal and state gift taxes. See id. at 1080
n.2. Initially, the total state and federal gift taxes were estimated at $208,500; only
later was the estimate reduced to the $150,000 figure. Id. at 1082 n.6. Thus, the court
seems justified in its analogy to the Turner situation. As stated in the text
accompanying note 51 infra, the only difference in the situations was one of timing.
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taxed. In fact, in Turner the Commissioner "conceded that the amounts
paid by the trustees to the doner (sic) were not taxable to her. . . ." 410
F.2d at 753.40
Based upon the above factors the court concluded that "Turner has no
precedential value beyond its peculiar fact situation, in view of the
Commissioner's concessions in that case .... -41
In his concurring opinion in Hirst, Judge Bryan seized upon the
statement that "Turner has no precedential value beyond its peculiar fact
situation" as an affirmation by the Sixth Circuit of the continued vitality of
Turner.42 However, a careful reading of the above-quoted language, which
precedes that statement, reveals that the Johnson court intended to achieve
the opposite result. In effect the court was saying that Turner will no longer
be respected when the IRS, as in Johnson, urges the discharge of debt theory
of income realization.
With this background in mind, the incorrectness of the Hirst court's
opinion can be better appreciated. At the outset of the opinion, the court
stated that its decision was based upon the theory that Johnson and Turner,
while both correct, are distinguishable. 43 Because the court believed the facts
in Hirst to be very similar to those in Turner, it held that, as in Turner, a
pro-taxpayer result was mandated.4 4 Of course, if the court had actually
agreed with Johnson it could not have based its decision on Turner, an
opinion which Johnson seemingly distinguished into oblivion.
Undaunted by this introductory defect in reasoning, the court proceeded
to explain its holding in more detail, stating that Hirst differed from
Johnson in that "the taxpayer [in Hirst] did not intend to sell anything; she
intended only to give property to her progeny." 45 With this statement, the
court reverted to what was believed by many commentators to be an
outmoded intent test.46 Because both Johnson and Malone rejected the
40. Id. at 1085 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 1086.
42. Judge Bryan said:
[T]he Commissioner and the .. .[dissent] assail Turner as disavowed by its
own circuit in Joseph W. Johnson, Jr. On the contrary, study of Johnson in
the Court of Appeals will utterly dispel any such claim for the effect of
Johnson.
S [W]e may not presume to hold that the Sixth Circuit intended to say
in Johnson that Turner was overridden, for the Sixth [Circuit] explicitly and
advisedly declined to say so.
True, Johnson said that Turner had "no precedential value beyond its
peculiar fact situation" but this declaration actually reaffirms Turner on its
own facts.
572 F.2d at 434 (Bryan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 428.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 430.
46. Several commentators had predicted that Johnson and Malone marked the
end of the intent test. See, e.g., Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject to Indebtedness:
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importance of intent, the Fourth Circuit's use of this test in Hirst set the
Commissioner's progress in the net gift cases back to the days of Turner.
Perhaps realizing that intent is no longer a widely accepted test, the
court next argued that the same pro-taxpayer result would be reached under
the discharge of debt theory employed in Johnson.47 First, the court stated
that Hirst could be distinguished from Johnson because in the latter the
taxpayer actually received $200,000, while in the former the taxpayer "did
not receive anything for herself; there was no economic gain ... accruing to
her . *... "48 This statement discloses a fundamental misunderstanding of
the discharge of debt concept. 49 Under that doctrine, a taxable gain does not
result solely from the receipt of cash in hand. Rather, the critical factor is
the donee's payment of the donor's obligation. As noted by the well-reasoned
dissent in Hirst, such a discharge of indebtedness is income to the donor
whether the donee pays the amount of the debt directly to the creditor, or
pays the debtor who in turn pays the creditor.50
The Johnson court noted that the only difference between the two
situations is one of timing:
[In Turner and Johnson] the taxpayers, assisted by attentive tax
counsel, attempted to raise cash and pay their gift taxes without
themselves incurring taxable gain from transactions needed to pay cash
.... In the murky tax planning days of the early 1960's, the Turner
lawyers advised one procedure and the lawyers in this case advised
another. For the results to diverge diametrically, we should be forced to
this conclusion by the words and policies of the Internal Revenue
Code.51
Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86 (1975); Note, Bad News for Net
Givers: Donee Payment of Gift Taxes Results in Taxable Income to Donor, 36 U. PrIT.
L. REV. 517 (1974).
47. 572 F.2d at 430 n.8. "In the present case, whether we consider the widow's
intent in making the transfer, or what she may have received as a result of the
transfer, our conclusion is the same; the transaction entails no income tax." Id.
48. Id. at 430.
49. Indeed, it seems to demonstrate unfamiliarity with the fundamental income
tax notion that gain can be realized without receiving any cash. For example, "[g]ain
may occur as a result of exchange of property. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461,
469 (1940).
50. Judge Thomsen stated that "[t]he effect of what was done in this case is the
same as though the son had paid the money directly to the taxpayer and she had used
it to discharge her gift tax liabilities." 572 F.2d at 438 (Thomsen, J., dissenting). I.R.C.
§61(a)(12) does not specify how the debt is to be discharged.
51. 495 F.2d at 1082 (footnote omitted). For examples of the guesswork of planners
in this area at the time the Turner and Johnson transactions were being undertaken,
compare Note, Assumption of Indebtedness by a Donee - Income Tax Consequences,
17 STAN. L. REV. 98, 105 (1964) and Comment, Income Tax Consequences of Gifts of
Property Encumbered in Excess of Basis, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 770, 774 (1960) with
Palmer, Tax Saving Through Charitable Giving, 36 TAXES 40 (1958) and Spears,
Mortgages in Excess of Basis, 1959 S. CAL. TAX INST. 883, 902 (1959).
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Similarly, different results in Johnson and Hirst due to this minor timing
difference do not seem justified under current tax law.
The Hirst court further demonstrated its misunderstanding of the
discharge of debt theory by stating that the following situation was
analogous to Hirst: "[w]here a son has borrowed from a bank and his father
pays off the son's loan . . . [t]he payment is not taxable to the son, but a
gift."' 52 Though the conclusion reached in this example is correct, it is
completely inapposite to Hirst. The example is based upon the recognized
exception to the discharge of debt rule that characterizes the discharge of
debt as a nontaxable gift to the debtor if the discharging party acts with
gratuitou's intent.5 3 While it may be arguable that Mrs. Hirst acted
gratuitously in conveying her property, the gift tax payment by her son, the
discharging party, was clearly not made out of donative intent. It is well
settled that a payment motivated by "the incentive of anticipated benefit of
any kind beyond the satisfaction which flows from the performance of a
generous act"5 4 does not qualify as a gift. Because Mrs. Hirst's son paid the
gift taxes in anticipation of his receipt of the real estate, the payment cannot
be called a gift. Therefore, the gift exception was totally inapplicable and, as
argued by the dissent, the debt discharged should have been treated as
taxable income to Mrs. Hirst.
55
52. 572 F.2d at 431.
53. "If the cancellation of an indebtedness is motivated by a donative intent.
the economic benefit to the debtor constitutes a gift. In such circumstances an amount
that could be gross income is brought within the explicit statutory protection of I.R.C.
(26 U.S.C.A.) § 102" J. FREELAND, S. LIND & STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 200 (2d ed. 1977). Other exceptions to the discharge of
debt rule exist for insolvency, contribution to capital, adjustment to purchase price,
and as provided in I.R.C. §§ 108 ("Income from discharge of indebtedness") & 1017
("Discharge of indebtedness").
54. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
55. Mention should be made of the Tax Court's handling of this case, as it seemed
to have some effect on at least one judge's decision on appeal. In his concurring
opinion, Judge Bryan stated that it was not within the appellate court's power to
reverse the Tax Court's finding that the situation involved "'a non-commercial family
transaction in which the donor received no funds.'" 572 F.2d at 432 (Bryan, J.,
concurring) (quoting 63 T.C. at 312). Judge Bryan stated that whether this statement
by the Tax Court constituted a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, it could not be
overturned on appeal. 572 F.2d at 432-33 (Bryan, J., concurring).
Though the Tax Court's decisions may be easier to reverse than Judge Bryan
realized, see Note, The Old Tax Court Blues: The Need for Uniformity in Tax
Litigation, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 970, 973 n.15 (1972), its decision was clearly an obstacle
for the Internal Revenue Service in Hirst. The Tax Court recognized the forcefulness
of the government's position but stated:
[I]n the absence of any clear-cut overruling of prior law by a Court of Appeals,
we are not prepared at this time to reexamine an intricate and consistent
pattern of decision that has evolved over the years in this field, notwithstand-
ing that there may be much to be said in favor of a more "realistic" approach
to the problem. Things have gone too far by now to wipe the slate clean and
start all over again.
63 T.C. at 315. The Tax Court's refusal to characterize Johnson as a "clear-cut
overruling" of Turner seems belied by a reading of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
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By its decision, the Hirst court has plunged the law relating to net gifts
into great confusion and has decreased the predictability of tax consequen-
ces in this area. The court's holding fails to recognize the recent
developments in the net gift concept. Although the basis of Turner was that
the donor of a net gift intends a gift rather than a sale, both Johnson and
Malone recognized that an intended sale is not a prerequisite to the
realization of income; a discharge of the donor's obligation will suffice.
Policy considerations seem strongly to favor following the Johnson
rationale. The relief from liability is a current, pecuniary benefit enjoyed by
the donor when he makes a net gift. One commentator has correctly noted
that "[a]s the person enjoying that benefit, the donor should naturally bear
the appropriate tax burden arising therefrom. ' 56 Additionally, use of this
theory would undoubtedly result in more consistent and predictable results
than the test currently used by the Fourth Circuit. Tax consequences would
be determined by objective criteria such as the amount of gift taxes assumed
by the donee and the donor's basis in the transferred property, rather than
by subjective questions concerning the intent of the parties. This enhanced
predictability would enable taxpayers to foresee tax consequences and to
plan accordingly. The result would be to benefit all parties by ending the
needless uncertainty surrounding the taxation of net gifts.5 7
Johnson. Furthermore, the court's adoption of the more realistic Johnson approach
would not "wipe the slate clean," thereby upsetting the expectations of the parties as
the court suggest. Rather, it would merely keep the Tax Court in step with the new
and better method established by the Sixth Circuit to deal with the problem of net
gifts. By deciding Hirst primarily on the basis of Turner rather than Johnson, the Tax
Court in fact altered the evolution of the concept of net gift taxation which had taken
place under the guiding hand of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
56. Note, supra note 24, at 953.
57. Id. at 954. Despite the service's defeat in Hirst, apparently it intends to
continue litigating the income tax consequences of net gifts. At the time this issue
went to press, the case of Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978) had
been appealed and was pending before the Sixth Circuit. The Tax Court decision in
Henry followed Turner.
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THE WARSAW CONVENTION CREATES A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH - BENJAMINS
v. BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS'
When the United States adhered to the Warsaw Convention 2 in 1934,
and for some years thereafter, it was generally understood that the
Convention created a cause of action for wrongful death or bodily injury of a
passenger in international air travel. 3 In the 1950's, however, two cases
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France4 and Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana,5 firmly established the rule that the Convention did not create
a cause of action, but only set forth conditions for a cause of action created
by domestic law. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
overturned this settled precedent in Benjamins v. British European Airways,
finding it inconsistent with a fundamental purpose of the Convention - the
creation of a uniform international air law.7
The Benjamins case arose out of the death in 1972 of Hilde Benjamins, a
passenger on an airplane flying from London to Brussels who was killed
when the plane crashed into a field near London.8 She was survived by her
husband Abraham; both were Dutch citizens permanently residing in
California. 9 As representative of his deceased wife's estate, Abraham
Benjamins brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York for wrongful death and baggage loss against the
aircraft's owner and operator, British European Airways, and its designer
and manufacturer, Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd. Both defendants were
British corporations with their principal places of business in the United
Kingdom. 10 Because the British European ticket used by Mrs. Benjamins
1. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, done Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention or Convention].
3. 572 F.2d at 916; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 517 (1967). See Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768, (Sup. Ct. 1951), affd mern., 281 App. Div. 965,
120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953). But see Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43
N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459, aff'd, 293 N.Y.
878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945).
4. 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
5. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'g 144 F. Supp 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957).
6. 572 F.2d at 916-17 (citing Komlos, 111 F. Supp. at 401-02; Noel, 247 F.2d at
679). See notes 35 to 51 and accompanying text infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 23 to 26, 49 to 51 & 77 to 78 infra.
8. 572 F.2d at 914.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 914-15.
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provided "international transportation" within the meaning of article 1 of
the Convention, and both the United States and the United Kingdom were
high contracting parties, 1 the Warsaw Convention was applicable to the
proceeding.
The major allegations in Benjamins' suit invoked articles 17 and 18 of
the Convention, which provide that the carrier "shall be liable" for damages
sustained in the event of death or baggage loss. 12 An initial complaint
alleging diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 had been dismissed
by the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because both the
plaintiff and defendants were aliens.13 The plaintiff amended his complaint,
basing federal jurisdiction upon both the Alien Tort Claims Act 14 and the
presence of a federal question "arising under" a treaty of the United States
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).15 The district court again
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning
that the case did not "arise" under a treaty of the United States because,
according to the rule of Komlos and Noel, the Convention did not create a
cause of action but merely imposed conditions upon causes of action created
11. Id. at 914. Article 1 provides that the Convention shall apply to all
international transportation by aircraft for hire, and defines "international transpor-
tation" as any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination are situated either within the
territories of two high contracting parties, or within the territory of a single high
contracting party if there is an agreed stopping place in another territory.
Transportation by several successive carriers is to be deemed "one undivided
transportation" if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation. See
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at 3014-15. Hilde Benjamins' ticket, which
constituted the contract of carriage, was for a round trip from Los Angeles. 572 F.2d
at 915.
12. 572 F.2d at 915. Article 17 (Injury to passenger) provides that
[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembark-
ing.
Article 18 (Damage to goods and baggage) provides that "[t]he carrier shall be liable
for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any
checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so
sustained took place during the transportation by air." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 2, at 3018-19. The only official version of the Convention is in French, but the
Senate had before it the standard English translation when it approved adherence to
the Convention. Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REV. 423, 426 (1945).
13. 572 F.2d at 915-19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), serves as a basis for federal
jurisdiction when a suit is between citizens of different states, citizens of a state and
foreign states or its citizens or subjects, and citizens of different states in which
foreign states are additional parties.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970) (currently at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).
15. Id. at 915-16. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976)), provided in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
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by the domestic law of the ratifying nations.16 The district court thus
concluded that because the Convention did not of its own force create a
cause of action the federal courts had no power to hear the case under
section 1331(a), and no federal statute authorized the plaintiffs wrongful
death action.
On appeal by Benjamins, the Second Circuit reversed this jurisdictional
ruling. In so doing, the court, per Judge Lumbard, first observed that the
courts of the United States had jurisdiction in the "international or treaty
sense" 17 because at least one of the general conditions enumerated in article
28(1)18 was satisfied. Because the round trip ticket used by Mrs. Benjamins
was purchased in the United States from one of the defendants and provided
for an ultimate destination in the United States, article 28(1) of the
Convention clearly permitted American courts to entertain the suit.19 The
court then addressed the real issue in the case: whether some statute
empowers a federal court to hear the case, thereby conferring jurisdiction in
the narrower "domestic law sense." After summarily rejecting the notion
the United States." 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1970) provides: 'The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Personal jurisdiction was not an issue in this case, as each party had
submitted to the in personam jurisdiction of the court. 572 F.2d at 915 n.4. Jurisdiction
over Hawker Siddeley Aviation was alleged under principles of pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 915 n.3.
16. Id. at 915. The absence of any discussion as to the district court's disposition
of the § 1350 claim in the Second Circuit's opinion possibly indicates that only the
§ 1331 ruling was appealed.
The phrase "arises under" used in § 1331 is derived directly from the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 63-.68 (3d ed. 1976). In Benjamins, as in most previous
discussions of the issue, the question whether a cause of action must be created by a
treaty in order for it to arise under the treaty and thus come within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts was ignored; the two expressions are not clearly distinguishable,
although they have been distinguished in other contexts. See C. WRIGHT, supra, at 66.
But see Zousmer v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 307 F. Supp. 892, 899-901 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), which answered the aforementioned question in the affirmative. See also note
86 infra; L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 16.01 [3] (1963).
17. 572 F.2d at 915 (quoting Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798,
800 (2d Cir. 1971)).
18. Article 28(1) provides that:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the
domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a
place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the
court at the place of destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at 3020. In Benjamins, jurisdiction at the first level
was allowed by article 28(1) because the United States was both the country of
ultimate destination and the country in which the ticket was purchased. 572 F.2d at
915. The court indicated, however, that a federal court was not the only possible forum
for Benjamins; both the California state courts and the English courts were open to
the plaintiff under article 28(1).
19. 572 F.2d at 915.
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that the Alien Tort Claims Act was such a statute because neither the treaty
nor the law of nations had been violated by the crash,20 the majority opinion
reexamined the "much-discussed question whether the Warsaw Convention
creates a cause of action" 21 and, in a sharp departure from the rule of
Komlos and Noel, concluded that it does. 22
The court's conclusion was based primarily on its determination that its
contrary decisions in prior cases impeded the development of an internation-
ally binding body of uniform air law, a derogation of what the majority
viewed as the obvious and fundamental purpose of the Convention, 23 and
that the text and record of the Convention are inconclusive as to whether an
action for damages was created.24 The court also discovered indications in
the language of articles 24 and 30(3), detailed provisions which describe
actions for damages founded upon the Convention, that its new reading of
the more general ("carrier shall be liable for damages") language of articles
17 and 18 was correct. 25 Judge Lumbard pointed out that two common law
nations, England and Canada, appear to have interpreted the Convention
as creating a cause of action. 26 Finally, the majority observed that the
relatively recent creation of efficient federal procedures for complex multi-
district litigation made federal jurisdiction "peculiarly appropriate in large
air crash cases," and that no large increase in the volume of federal cases
would result from its ruling.27
In dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland castigated the majority for rashly
upsetting well-settled precedent and rewriting by judicial fiat a treaty that
no longer met with its approval.28 He argued that caution was especially
necessary because the Convention was subject to an ongoing reappraisal by
the executive and legislative branches, and an amendment which might be
construed to overrule Komlos and Noel was then before the Senate. 29 In any
event, Judge Van Graafeiland was not persuaded that the majority's new
interpretation was correct because, in his view, article 17 was far too
20. Id. at 916. See note 15 supra. The treaty does not outlaw air crashes, but only
the failure of airline companies to compensate victims appropriately. Similarly, the
law of nations does not prohibit crashes under the standards set forth in I1T v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975): "[A] violation of the law of nations
arises only when there has been a violation ... of those standards, rules or customs
(a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign
state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se."
(quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)).
21. 572 F.2d at 914.
22. Id. at 917-19.
23. Id. See text accompanying notes 77 to 78 infra.
24. See notes 75 to 102 and accompanying text infra.
25. 572 F.2d at 918. See notes 61 to 74 and accompanying text infra.
26. 572 F.2d at 918-19. See notes 89 to 90 and accompanying text infra.
27. 572 F.2d at 919. See notes 101, 107 & 108 and accompanying text infra.
28. 572 F.2d at 920 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 920-22 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See notes 109 to 114 and
accompanying text infra.
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general, lacking the specificity traditionally found in statutes authorizing
recovery for wrongful death. 30 Judge Van Graafeiland concluded that the
established construction was consistent with both the text of the treaty
31
and with its basic purpose of effectuating uniformity of remedies and
procedure.32 Moreover, he observed, uniformity would not necessarily be
promoted by the court's ruling because state and federal causes of action
would coexist, and in enforcing a federal cause of action based on the treaty,
federal courts would have to look to other sources of law in order to supply
the elements missing from the Convention.33 The dissenting opinion closed
with an expression of concern that the majority's arguments for uniformity
in fact cloaked a preference for the extention of federal jurisdiction - an
undesirable result in itself.3 4
The former Second Circuit rule had its genesis in Judge Leibell's opinion
for the district court in Komlos, 35 a case involving a dispute between two
plaintiffs as to which had the right to bring an action in tort for a wrongful
death which had occurred in an air crash in Portugal. Defendant Air France
argued that the Warsaw Convention created a cause of action in contract,
supplanting the tort action, and that the lex fori (law of the forum), the law
of New York, determined who had the right to bring suit.3 6 The court held
that the cause of action for wrongful death was not created by the
Convention, but was instead an action in tort based upon the lex loci delicti
(law of the place of the wrong), and applied Portugese law to determine who
might sue.3 7 Judge Leibell indicated, however, that a suit once brought
30. 572 F.2d at 921 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See notes 91 to 97 and
accompanying text infra.
31. 572 F.2d at 922 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See notes 95 to 97 and
accompanying text infra.
32. 572 F.2d at 922.
33. The courts would have to look to local law to decide the questions of standing
to sue in the event of the passenger's death (article 24(2)), the effects of contributory
negligence (article 21), questions of procedure (article 28(2)), and the running of
statutes of limitations (article 29). See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at
517.
34. 572 F.2d at 922-23 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See notes 101 & 102 and
accompanying text infra.
35. 111 F. Supp. 393. Komlos, strictly speaking, construed article 17 only. The
Benjamins majority analyzed article 18, which is similar in language to article 17 but
deals only with baggage loss, in conjunction with article 17. The Benjamins dissent
ignored article 18.
36. 111 F. Supp. at 399.
37. Id. at 401-04. A federal court, sitting in New York, must apply the New York
conflict of laws doctrine, according to which tort liability is governed by the lex loci
delicti. 209 F.2d at 438 n.1. Judge Leibell, rather than holding that the Convention did
not preclude the maintenance of a tort action in answer to Air France's claim that the
Convention created an exclusive action in contract, denied that it created any action.
Id. at 401-04. For a discussion of a conceivable middle position, see notes 82 to 90 and
accompanying text infra.
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would be subject to the conditions set forth in the Convention. 38 The district
court in Komlos decided that a reading of article 17, in conjunction with
other provisions of the Convention, clearly demonstrated that the Conven-
tion created only a presumption of liability that is subject to rebuttal and
limitation in accordance with other articles.3 9 This interpretation was first
suggested in, and to some extent confirmed by, a 1934 letter from then
Secretary of State Hull to President Roosevelt recommending adherence to
the Convention. Secretary Hull wrote: "The effect of article 17 (ch. III) of the
Convention is to create a presumption of liability against the aerial carrier
on the mere happening of an accident occasioning injury or death of a
passenger subject to certain defenses allowed under the convention to the
aerial carrier."40 Having concluded that article 17 was thus limited in scope,
the court, in dictum, expressed the view that if the lex loci delicti provided no
right of action for wrongful death, article 17 "might be said" to supply one. 41
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court on other
grounds, without even mentioning the Convention. One could read the
appellate court's declaration that there was a "single indivisible cause of
action" to which Portuguese law applied, however, as an implicit concur-
rence in the district court's holding that the Convention did not create a
cause of action. 42
In the subsequent Noel case, in which a civil suit was brought for
wrongful death resulting from the crash of a foreign airliner on the high
seas, the district court held that the Convention alone could not support the
plaintiffs cause of action because the Second Circuit had "settled the issue"
of the nature of a cause of action for wrongful death covered by the Warsaw
Convention when it "clearly held that the lex loci delicti was to be applied
by the district court even though the Convention was applicable." 43 The
Second Circuit approved this interpretation on appeal, stating that its
decision in Komlos had "impliedly agreed with Judge Leibell's [lower court]
decision . . . that the Convention did not create an independent right of
38. 111 F. Supp. at 400-02. In sum, the following articles of the Convention set
forth uniform rules: article 28 (venue); article 20 (burden of proof); articles 20 & 25
(standards of negligence (carrier exemption from liability when all necessary
measures to avoid damage are taken and exemptions from limitation on liability for
damage caused by carrier's wilful misconduct)); articles 18(3) & 26 (presumptions of
liability); article 23 (restriction of contractual limitation of liability); article 27 (suits
against the tortfeasor's estate); article 29 (statute of limitations); article 30 (liability
when carriage is performed by more than one carrier).
39. 111 F. Supp. at 401-02. Specifically, Judge Leibell referred to article 20(1)
(complete defense to article 17 claim), article 22 (financial limitation of liability), and
article 25 (no limitation of liability when there is wilful misconduct).
40. 111 F. Supp. at 401-02. (quoting 1934 U.S. Av. REP. 240, 243).
41. 111 F. Supp. at 402.
42. 209 F.2d at 438. The reversal of the district court on the question of which
plaintiff might sue was based upon the importance of not splitting the cause of action.
Id. at 439.
43. 144 F. Supp. at 361.
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action." 44 The Noel court found no basis for, and expressly rejected, Judge
Leibell's dictum suggesting an exception to this rule when the lex loci delicti
provided no right of action.45
The Noel rule that the Convention does not create a cause of action was
widely adopted by other courts,46 but not always without question. In the
1975 case of Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,4 7 the district court
remarked that this "sometimes criticized principle of law" might seem
"incongruous and incorrect," but was well-established and could be
supported by an examination of the language and purpose of the
Convention. 8 In Reed v. Wiser,49 the Second Circuit subsequently addressed
the question of purpose, declaring that "the Convention was intended to act
as an international uniform law" whose substantive provisions bind the
forum.50 The majority in Benjamins recognized the apparent inconsistency
between this statement and its previous decision in Noel, pointedly stating
that "[the time has come to examine the question whether our view of the
Convention as an internationally binding body of uniform air law permits
us any longer to deny that a cause of action may be founded on the
Convention itself, rather than on any domestic law. '51 This reassessment of
settled precedent was, according to the Benjamins majority, compelled by
the paucity of analysis accompanying the adoption of the Noel rule and by
the fundamental purpose of the Convention itself.
The principal controversy over the Convention's purpose is centered on
the original intention behind article 17 and the propriety of using that
44. 247 F.2d at 679. The appellate opinion was written by Judge Lumbard, who
wrote in Benjamins: "[W]e do not see what there was about our decision in Komlos
that constituted implicit agreement with Judge Leibell, and compelled the result in
Noel." 572 F.2d at 919.
45. 247 F.2d at 679-80.
46. See, e.g., Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.2
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F.
Supp. 1238, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702,
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973); Zousmer v.
Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 307 F. Supp. 892, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Notarian v.
TWA, Inc. 244 F. Supp. 874, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
47. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
48. Id. at 1243, 1251-52.
49. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
50. 555 F.2d at 1083, 1092.
51. 572 F.2d at 917. But see id. at 922 n.5, where Judge Van Graafeiland, who sat
on the Reed court, interpreted the principle of uniformity as applied in Reed to
encompass the Convention's limitation-of-liability provisions but not to imply the
creation of a cause of action. The Reed court had held that an action against a
carrier's employees (in that case a pilot) was governed by the Convention's limitation
of liability provisions, but there was no suggestion that the cause of action had its
origin in the Convention. The Reed court remarked that victims of international air
disasters, in addition to seeking redress from the airline company or manufacturer of
the airplane, might also bring suit to recover damages from the pilot under the
common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and under the civil law doctrine of absolute
liability. 555 F.2d at 1082, 1092.
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article to create a cause of action rather than interpreting it as a mere
statement of conditions necessary to an action otherwise founded. Each side
of this controversy finds some support in the text of the Convention, which
is inconclusive on the issue that was before the court in Benjamins. In
evaluating the Benjamins court's analysis of the question whether a cause
of action may be founded on the Convention itself, the following discussion
will first consider arguments based on the text of the Convention, 52 proceed
to the question of the use of article 17 as the basis of such an action, 53 and
conclude with an examination of the more general considerations which
bear upon a court's decision to overturn a settled treaty interpretation.
54
As a treaty entered into by the United States, the Warsaw Convention
forms part of the "supreme Law of the Land," overriding contrary state and
local laws.5 5 According to the Benjamins dissent, "the plain language of
[article 17] is the majority's strongest argument that the Convention created
a right to sue. '5 6 However, the discussions among the delegates at the
Warsaw Convention also appear to support such a reading of article 17,57
and it was always assumed in the voluminous writings after the ratification
52. Notes 55 to 74 and accompanying text infra.
53. Notes 77 to 99 and accompanying text infra.
54. Notes 100 to 115 and accompanying text infra.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. This understanding of the Convention's effect was
noted soon after its ratification in Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963,
964, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d
459, aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945), and was
generally agreed to in Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 96, 85 N.E.2d 880,
884-85 (1949); Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 269 App. Div. 287, 292, 55 N.Y.S.2d
317, 321, aff'd per curiam, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741
(1946), 338 U.S. 824 (1949); Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V.,
107 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917
(1953). Initially, doubt existed as to whether the Convention was self-executing, Choy
v. Pan-Am. Airways Co., 1941 AM. MAR. CASES 483 (S.D.N.Y.), but this did not persist,
at least with respect to the liability provisions. See Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America
v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Orr, supra note 12, at
435. See also Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pt. II), 26
J. AIR L. & COM. 323, 333-36 (1959). No private rights can be enforced by a treaty that
is not self-executing. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 835 (1976).
56. 572 F.2d at 921 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
57. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. The Citeja draft, a composite of
earlier drafts submitted by international groups, constituted the basic working
document for delegates at the Warsaw Convention. This draft provided for a complete
system of liability based on the contract of carriage. As indicated in article 26, "[tlhe
liability action may not be instituted against the carrier except on the basis of this
Convention." Calkins, in his article on the Convention, stated that nothing in the
record of the Warsaw Convention indicates a departure from this original creation-of-
a-contract-right approach to one which merely imposed conditions on rights of action
otherwise available under the domestic law of the signatory nations. See Calkins, The
Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pt. I), 26 J. AIR. L. & COM. 217,
221-27, 236 (1959); notes 69 to 71 and accompanying text infra.
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of the Convention that the right to a cause of action had been created. 58
Such a right was deemed to be of significant advantage to plaintiffs, who
otherwise would have to rely on foreign law and perhaps be denied suit
altogether. Despite this evidence that the Convention was intended to create
a cause of action, the two relevant cases preceding Komlos, which were both
heard in the state courts of New York, had split on the point. In Wyman v.
Pan American Airways, Inc.,5 9 the "purely statutory right" to bring a
wrongful death action was held not to be created by the Convention because
the Convention was not viewed as creating any new substantive rights. 6°
However, the subsequent case of Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij, N. V., ' ignored Wyman (although it had been affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals) and ruled that article 17 "clearly purports to
create a cause of action in Art. 17,"62 reasoning that if article 17 did not
create a cause of action it would be difficult to understand just what it did
do.
6 3
Because the language of articles 17 and 1864 is not in itself decisive,
these articles must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the Conven-
tion in order to discern their intended meaning. Article 30(3) provides that
in the case of transportation by severl carriers constituting one undivided
transportation, the passenger "shall have a right of action" against the
appropriate carrier for baggage loss or damage. In holding that the
Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful death, the Benjamins
majority relied on the First Circuit's opinion in Seth v. British Overseas
Airways Corp.,6 5 which in turn relied upon article 30(3), holding that "the
Convention not only imposes liability on an air carrier for the loss of
checked baggage but also gives a passenger whose baggage is lost a right of
action to enforce that liability. '66 On this analysis, Seth held that a suit for
baggage loss arose under a treaty of the United States and was therefore
within the jurisdiction granted to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.67
58. A right of action founded on foreign law, the law of either the home country of
the carrier or the place of accident might not provide recovery for wrongful death or
might restrict recovery to a level lower than the maximum recovery provided by the
Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 517. See L. KREINDLER, supra
note 16, at § 11.08; Comment, Air Passenger Deaths, 41 CORN. L.Q. 243, 256 (1956).
59. 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48
N.Y.S.2d 459, aff'd per curiam, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 882 (1945).
60. 43 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The court did, however, recognize that as a treaty entered
into pursuant to the Constitution, the Convention was the law of the land. See note 55
supra.
61. 107 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d
917 (1953).
62. 107 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73.
63. Id.
64. See note 12 supra.
65. 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1964), cited in 572 F.2d at
918.
66. 329 F.2d at 305.
67. Id. at 304.
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The Seth analysis of article 30(3) is convincing with respect to baggage
claims involving several carriers, but that article was specifically designed
to obviate problems arising out of transportation by successive carriers and
has no applicability to personal injury claims or baggage claims involving
only one carrier. Moreover, the operative language of article 30 - "the
passenger shall have a right of action" - suggests more strongly the
conclusion that a cause of action was created than does the operative
language of articles 17 and 18: "the carrier shall be liable." Other articles
which arguably bear on the intent of articles 17 and 18 have also been
subject to conflicting interpretations, but the district court in Komlos6 8
scarcely examined them in determining that articles 17 and 18 did not create
a cause of action. In a 1959 study6 9 published with the aim of convincing the
courts to reject the rule of Komlos and Noel,70 one prominent commentator
concluded that "even a cursory reading" of the initial draft of the
Convention reveals that a contractual right of action was meant to be
created, and sought to demonstrate that no changes substantially altering
this intended effect appeared in the final text.71 Conversely, the analysis
lacking in Komlos (and Noel) was supplied by a law review comment which
argued that the provisions for the rebuttal of liability in the articles
following article 17 strongly suggest that that article was intended to create
only a presumption of liability. 72 According to this analysis, adopted by
Judge Van Graafeiland in his Benjamins dissent, the true meaning of the
seemingly absolute "carrier shall be liable" language of article 17 is revealed
only when it is read in conjunction with the provision of article 20(1) that
the carrier shall not be liable if it proves that it was free from negligence. On
this reasoning one might conclude that article 17 was intended only to shift
the burden of proof on negligence through the creation of a rebuttable
presumption applicable to a cause of action, however founded, and not to
create a cause of action. Article 24, which provides that under articles 17 and
18 "any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject
to the conditions and limits set out in this convention," has been the subject
of similarly disparate interpretations and is therefore of dubious utility
in interpreting the meaning of articles 17 and 18. What the phrase "however
founded" refers to is not clear, 73 and it has been plausibly argued that the
68. 111 F. Supp. at 401-02.
69. Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pts. I & II), 26
J. AIR L. & CoM. 217, 323 (1959). Mr. Calkins was chairman of the United States
delegation at the Hague Conference to amend the Convention in 1955.
70. Id. at 325.
71. Id. at 223, 235.
72. See Comment, supra note 58, at 260.
73. According to the Benjamins majority, "[trhere is no internal evidence to
indicate whether 'however founded' [A quelque titre que se soit] was intended to refer
to a number of possible domestic law sources or to a number of possible factual bases
for the envisioned action." 572 F.2d at 918. Calkins argued that the intent of the
draftsmen was to insure that tort causes of action based on the lex loci delicti would
be subject to the same conditions as the contractual cause of action created by the
1978]
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words "subject to the conditions," which suggest that the cause of action
arises from sources other than the Convention, might have been better
translated from the original French as "within the terms.."74
Because the text is patently inconclusive with respect to whether the
Convention created a cause of action, it is necessary for an interpreter of the
Convention to look to other aids, in particular the consideration of the
underlying purpose of the Convention. Such recourse to general purpose is,
under general- principles of statutory construction, 75 especially appropriate
when the language in question forms part of a treaty, because a policy of
liberal interpretation and generous attention to the purpose and genesis of
such documents is widely accepted by the courts.7 6
That the Convention was intended to establish some degree of
uniformity for various aspects of international air transportation, and
especially to set a uniform limit of liability of the carrier in case of accidents
is not open to question.7 7 Rather, as stated previously, the main area of
Convention so as to maintain the principle of uniformity. Calkins, supra note 69, at
327. See note 86 infra; cf. note 111 and accompanying text infra (revised text of article
24).
74. 572 F.2d at 918 (citing Calkins, supra note 69, at 225-26). The French term
"les conditions" had been translated as "with the terms" by a drafting subcommittee
of the Convention. "Les conditions" has several meanings, however, including the
strict legal definition commonly attributed to the English term "conditions." Calkins
viewed "with the terms" as the correct translation because it was more compatible
with the original Citeja document which had translated the operative language of
article 24 as: "the liability action shall not be brought against the carrier except on
the basis of this convention." (Emphasis added).
75. Blind trust in "plain words" can put a court into a "verbal prison," according
to Justice Frankfurter. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 358 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hand declared that "the purpose of a statutory provision is the best
test of the meaning of the words chosen. We are to put ourselves so far as we can in
the position of the legislature that uttered them .... [A]t times the purpose may be so
manifest as to override even the explicit words used." Cawley v. United States, 272
F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). The Second Circuit again expressed this view at some
length in a Warsaw Convention case, Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804,
812, 814 (2d Cir. 1966), and briefly in Lisi v. Alitalia- Linee Aeroe Italienne 370 F.2d
508, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). But
see 370 F.2d at 515 (Moore, J., dissenting).
76. "A treaty, being a compact between two sovereigns, must be construed
broadly to accomplish the intent of the contracting parties." American Trust Co. v.
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1957). The Fifth Circuit, in referring to the
Convention remarked that "the determination in an American court of the meaning of
an international convention drawn by continental jurists is hardly possible without
considering the conception, parturition, and growth of the convention." Block v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968). See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1978); Maugnie v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977); Rosman v. TWA, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 395, 314 N.E.2d 848, 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97,
106 (1974).
77. See, e.g., Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99.
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conflict concerning the Convention in general and article 17 in particular, is
whether this uniformity of air law was to extend to the creation of rights of
action without reference to national law, or to be restricted to the
establishment of conditions and limitations applicable to causes of action
created by local laws. The majority in Benjamins found the latter
alternative to be inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Convention, reasoning that the application of rules intended to be applicable
universally should not be dependent upon local causes of action because
such causes of action may not exist.78 The court's conclusion that the
principle of uniformity extends to the creation of an independent right of
action is not self-evident. Such a conclusion is not compelled by the text,
and as the majority recognized, "it is not literally inconsistent with [the'
principle of] universal applicability to insist that a would-be plaintiff first
find an appropriate cause of action in the domestic law of a signatory
S. . ."79 However, only a scant discussion of the possible basis for its
conclusion in the history of the Convention appeared in the court's opinion.
The majority's failure to discuss the record of the Convention and its
bearing on the issue before the court suggests a disregard of the importance
of delineating the purported intention of the drafters through reasoned
analysis. This omission, when coupled with the court's characterization of
the question decided as an "important question of policy"s and emphasis on
"the desirability of uniformity in international air law,"8' leaves the
majority open to a charge of judicial irresponsibility - a willingness to act
by fiat to produce a desirable result.
A leading article on the purpose and intention of the Convention8 2
sought to demonstrate through a detailed investigation of the various drafts
and debates comprising the original Convention proceedings that the
Convention was designed to create a right of action based upon the contract
of carriage in accordance with the basic law of the civil law countries.8 3
While admitting that this theory was contrary to the common law rule that
wrongful death actions must sound in tort and be based on the lex loci
delicti,8 4 the author argued that the debates can only be understood as
78. 572 F.2d at 917-18. Prior to the Benjamins ruling it was conceivable that an
American court, applying the foreign lex loci delicti in accordance with the traditional
place-of-the-wrong conflict rules, would find that a plaintiff had no cause of action for
wrongful death. Judge Van Graafeiland pointed out that, changes in conflict-of-laws
rules had basically eliminated the likelihood of such an outcome by the time of
Benjamins. Id. at 923 n.7 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (citing Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 526-32).
79. 572 F.2d at 917-18.
80. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
83. Calkins, supra note 69, at 218, 223, 323.
84. Id. at 323-25. At common law, actions for wrongful death based on breach of
contract were not ordinarily allowed. Comment, supra note 58, at 255. In the United
States, "it seems reasonable to suppose that the wrongful death statutes were
19781
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
creating a cause of action in contract, 5 and concluded that the recognition
of a contractual cause of action created by the Convention would not
preclude a tort action based upon the lex loci delicti.8 6 The article took great
pains to demonstrate that the Komlos court's discussion of whether the
Convention created a cause of action was largely dictum 7 because the
precise issue before the court was whether the Convention created an
exclusive cause of action which barred a suit based solely on domestic law.
It concluded that the broad rule laid down in Kornlos and approved in Noel
was "not supported by the legislative history of the Convention, and [was]
contrary to its basic philosophy, which is to impose the liability rules set out
therein as terms of specific contracts of carriage."8' The majority in
Benjamins, though eschewing analysis of the history of the Convention, did
rely heavily on the fact that other common law countries have circumvented
the problem raised by the common law rule against contract actions for
wrongful death by enacting legislation that expressly substitutes liability
created by the Convention for any other statutory or common law liability.89
It viewed these statutes as implicitly interpreting the Convention as
creating an independent right of action, and found these interpretations by
other signatories "more compelling" than an explication of the text 0
intended to refer only to torts," although they apply to the "breach of a tort duty
arising out of a contract relation, such as that of carrier and passenger." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 903 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of such
statutes, see notes 88 to 96 and accompanying text infra. Generally speaking, "[tjhe
obligation of a carrier to a passenger for his safe carriage is . . . dealt with as an
obligation imposed by the law of torts rather than as one assumed by contract."
Comment, supra note 58, at 254 (quoting 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1113 (Williston
& Thompson rev. ed. 1936)). This position was taken in, e.g., Maynard v. Eastern Air
Lines, 178 F.2d 139, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1949), which was cited by Judge Leibell in Komlos
to support the claim that "[t]he Warsaw Convention does not change the basic rule
that the contract of carriage is not the gravamen of the action for wrongful death."
111 F. Supp. at 401.
85. Calkins, supra note 69, at 227-36.
86. Id. at 326-33, 342-43. Calkins' thesis is that the Convention creates a non-
exclusive contractual cause of action arising out of the lex fori, which determines both
who may sue and the rights of the different plaintiffs. Id. at 332. See note 16 supra.
87. Id. at 330-31.
88. Id. at 342.
89. Id. at 323-24. The English statute enacting the original 1929 Convention
provided that "[a]ny liability imposed by Article seventeen of the [Convention] on a
carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability
of the carrier in respect of the death of that passenger either under any statute or at
common law. . . ." Carriage by Air Act, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1(4) (1932). Canadian
and Australian legislation is substantially similar. Calkins, supra note 69, at 324.
90. 572 F.2d at 918. The "in substitution for" language, see note 89 supra, was
omitted in 1962 when the United Kingdom reenacted the Convention as amended at
the Hague, but, as the Benjamins majority pointed out, "[n]o case law since 1962 has
demonstrated that the source of carrier liability lies anywhere but in the Convention."
Id. at 919. But see Comment, supra note 58, at 260-61 where the explicit provision in
British law was considered evidence that the Convention was not meant to create a
cause of action.
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The common law legacy of nonrecognition of wrongful death actions,
however, undercuts the Benjamins analysis and conclusion. It was generally
accepted in the United States at the time the Convention was ratified that a
statutory provision was necessary to authorize recovery for wrongful
death. 91 Moreover, as some decisions have noted,92 the Convention lacks the
specification of beneficiaries, damages recoverable, the effect of contributory
negligence, and other matters93 that have traditionally been included in
statutes creating a cause of action for wrongful death.94 Although the
forceful phrasing of article 17's broad provision that "the carrier shall be
liable" suggests the intention to create a cause of action, the article's failure
to set out conditions and terms of recovery militates against the majority's
expansive interpretation.
This failure has been cited in support of the view, first suggested in the
Hull letter 95 and later adopted by Judge Leibell in Komlos,96 that article 17
merely created a presumption of liability that shifted the burden of proof
and simplified the plaintiffs recovery procedure. Judge Van Graafeiland
argued for this interpretation in his dissent, contending that "[tihe basic
trade-off under Warsaw was that the carrier was given a limitation on
91. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 539 (1933); Salsedo v. Palmer,
278 F. 92, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1921); 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 1:1
to 1:25 (2d ed. 1975). Moses and Salsedo were contemporaneous with the original
debates of the Convention in which this doctrine was expressed.
92. Judge Van Graafeiland observed that a survey of death statutes, collected in 2
S. SPEISER, supra note 91, apps. A & B, indicated that "virtually every one, whether
domestic or foreign, specifies who are the beneficiaries of the wrongful death action
and what type of damages may be recovered." 572 F.2d at 921 n.3 (Van Graafeiland,
J., dissenting). In Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24, 28 (N.D. Miss. 1960), the
Federal Aviation Act was held not to create a cause of action for wrongful death
because it did not "expressly create such a cause of action nor name the beneficiaries
thereof, nor prescribe how, if at all, contributory negligence, comparative negligence,
assumption of risk, measure of damages, limit of recovery or any other yardstick are
[sic] to be applied on trial." These were matters "traditionally considered vital to the
creation of a new right of action." Zousmer v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 307 F.
Supp. 892, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
93. See note 33 supra. In Zousmer v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 307 F. Supp.
892 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing with approval Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D.
Miss. 1960)), the court considered questions "similar" to those raised in Moody (see
note 92 supra) in reference to a wrongful death claim brought under the Convention,
and found that the Convention's provisions were not specific enough to support
removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) which, like § 1331(a), refers to actions
"arising under" treaties. The Zousmer court concluded that in holding otherwise a
court would find itself "mired in a no man's land of undeveloped law." 307 F. Supp. at
901.
94. In contrast, The Federal Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761- 767
(1970), does specify, inter alia, beneficiaries, amount and apportionment of recovery,
and limitations. The significance of this distinction was discussed in Noel, 247 F.2d at
680.
95. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 35 to 40 supra.
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liability while the claimant gained a simplified recovery procedure;"9 7 but it
would appear that this trade off does not represent a reasonable quid pro
quo. Attorneys experienced in airline accident claims have indicated that
negligence can usually be proven by able counsel, thus rendering the
creation of presumption of little value,98 while the limitation of liability is
obviously of substantial importance. An explanation for the apparent
unfairness of the purported trade off, which is at the heart of the dissent's
interpretation, may lie in the fact that proof of negligence was more difficult,
and experience with aviation accident litigation more limited, when the
Convention was ratified. Nevertheless, the query in Salamon as to what
article 17 did, if it did not create a cause of action,99 still appears justified.
The Benjamins court appears to have reached a sound conclusion in
adopting the view that, because the text of the Convention is unclear on the
question whether the Convention creates a cause of action, it was
appropriate to take into account the general purpose of the Convention and
decide the case on the basis of the overriding and desirable policy favoring
uniformity in the development of international air law., °° The creation of
new federal procedures for multidistrict litigationo1  makes federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 particularly advantageous, given the
unavailability of such centralized procedures in state courts. Because this
prospective uniformity will operate at the national rather than the
international level, Judge Van Graafeiland doubted that any substantial
benefit would be achieved. He warned that if the right of action created by
the Convention were not exclusive, coexistent federal and state claims would
be pleaded in the same court. Moreover, according to the dissent, the
Convention's lack of specificity might well have to be remedied through
97. 572 F.2d at 922 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (paraphrasing Two Related
Protocols Done at Montreal to Amend the Warsaw Convention: Hearings on Ex. B.,
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977)
(statement of Linda H. Kamm) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]). See Boyle, The
Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 43 (1975). But
see Calkins, supra note 69, at 328-29, where the author argues that the Hull letter
cannot be read as describing the entire function of article 17. See also 572 F.2d at 919.
98. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Aeronautics, Report on the Warsaw
Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 255, 259 (1959).
Even if negligence cannot be proven, "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be invoked,
which, at least, provides the passenger with an inference of negligence sufficient to
carry his case to a jury." Id. The report relies on H. DRION, LIMITATIONS OF
LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW (1954), wherein the "trade-off" was rejected
as a reasonable justification for limited carrier liability. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Aeronautics, supra at 256, 259. Contra, Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J. 1957).
99. See text accompanying notes 61 to 63 supra.
100. 572 F.2d at 919.
101. Id. The procedures, authorized in 1968 by passage of the statute creating the
Judicial Panel on Multi district Litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), include
consolidation and assignment to one expert judge. 572 F.2d at 919.
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reliance upon local law, which could be expected to dilute the envisioned
uniformity.102
The lack of specificity in the Convention's provisions appears to have
left the federal courts unprepared for Benjamins' new ruling. However, the
difficulties of interpretation it creates will probably not be confined to
Convention cases heard in federal court, for the 1970 Supreme Court
decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,10 3 altered the entire field of
wrongful death law by creating a federal nonstatutory cause of action for
wrongful death under the general maritime law. 0 4 The Supreme Court also
held in Moragne that the Death on the High Seas Act was not intended to
preclude the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general
maritime law in situations not covered by the Act.10 5 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts subsequently relied upon Moragne to declare the
existence of a common law right to sue for wrongful death and stated the
corollary that "[Massachusetts] wrongful death statutes [would] no longer
be regarded as 'creating the right' to recovery for wrongful death" but would
rather set forth the limitations on liability. 106 Such developments suggest, at
the very least, that the past understanding of wrongful death actions may
have been faulty, and they make plain that courts must now accept
nonspecific causes of action for wrongful death.
Because federal jurisdiction over wrongful death cases usually is
asserted under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the majority did not
fear that its holding would result in an overcrowding of the federal courts.10 7
In any event, the total number of wrongful death cases to which the
Convention might apply in a given year is not very large.08
Finally, the current reevaluation of the Convention by the executive and
legislative branches of the government brings into question the role that the
judiciary should play in departing from an established treaty interpretation.
102. 572 F.2d at 922 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). See also note 93 supra.
103. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 402.
106. Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (1972); Meagher v.
Electrolux Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1009, 1010 (D. Mass. 1975) (quoting Gaudette with
approval).
107. "[Olnly when plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens, but the United States is
a nation with treaty jurisdiction, will it be necessary to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1331." 572
F.2d at 915. Most diversity cases - though not those involving aliens - would be
removed from federal jurisdiction under legislation (H.R. 9622 & S. 2389, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978)) which is widely supported and has passed the House. See Abolition of
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 124 CONG. REC. H1553 (daily
ed. Feb. 28, 1978); Major Legislation of Interest to Lawyers, 64 A.B.A.J. 676 (1978). If
this legislation becomes law the federal courts will be less crowded than before, and
thus there will be still less reason to fear the effects of expansion of federal
jurisdiction resulting from Benjamins. On the other hand, more cases will then enter
the federal courts under § 1331 than would have entered by that route had Benjamins
not been decided.
108. See Boyle, supra note 97, at 84.
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The Guatemala City Protocol to the Convention, which has been signed by
the United States and is presently before the Senate, 10 9 would amend article
17 to establish a system of absolute carrier liability (no-fault liability), 10 and
apparently would create a cause of action in that article. 1' In view of the
tortuous history of the Convention, 112 one cannot confidently expect
ratification of the pending amendments. Nevertheless, Judge Van Graafei-
land wrote, "the mere fact that the amendments are pending is clear
indication that this matter is one which should be left to the coordinate
branches of our Government, at least in the absence of some compelling
reason." 113 Because Benjamins could bring his suit in a number of forums
other than the federal courts, the judge believed that the case presented no
such reason." 4 The soundness of this argument is undermined by the fact
that it implies that a court should, as part of its responsibility to the
legislature, attempt to anticipate legislative actions. The legislature, as a
result of its deliberations, may do nothing; and the court has an affirmative
duty to the litigants to decide fairly the case before it, even if this entails a
significant departure from one of its previous decisions.
The direct effect of the Benjamins decision will be only to admit to the
federal courts a small number of cases which would otherwise have been
excluded. Its true significance derives from the importance of the Warsaw
Convention, which stands as a striking example of international coopera-
tion, having more adherents than any other of the world's treaties
governing private law relationships. 1 5 The decision demonstrates to the
international community the willingness of an American federal court to
revise its prior interpretation of the Convention in furtherance of the
principle of uniformity in international air law.
109. Hearings, supra note 97.
110. Id. at 8 (statement of Herbert J. Hansell). "By introducing the concept of
absolute liability to international aviation treaty law, Protocol No. 3 makes a major
step beyond the rebuttable presumption set forth in the Warsaw Convention. Except
in cases where contributory negligence is involved, Protocol No. 3 guarantees recovery
against the airline, leaving for proof only the extent of damage." Id. at 38 (statement
of James E. Landry).
111. The new text of article 24 states in part: "Any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of liability set out in this
Convention ...." The Guatemala City Protocol, Art. IX, amending article 24 of the
Convention. See Boyle, supra note 97, at 74; Note, The Guatemala City Protocol, 5
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITIcs 313, 324-27 (1972).
112. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3.
113. 572 F.2d at 921 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
114. Id. See generally text accompanying notes 17 to 19 supra.
115. Hearings, supra note 97, at 3 (statement of Herbert J. Hansell). See Boyle,
supra note 97, at 84.
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